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Abstract 
This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between trading countries. We 
present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public 
goods, while regulation of entry determines the number of firms in the markets. We find (i) no strategic 
interaction in commodity taxes; (ii) regulation leads to lower commodity tax rates if demand for public 
goods is more sensitive to income than demand for private goods and (iii) regulation policy is a 
strategically complement instrument if consumers do not over value product diversity. In the empirical 
part of the paper, we test our predictions using panel data for 21 OECD countries over the period 1990-
2008. 
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1 Introduction
This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between trading coun-
tries. A large literature in public economics investigates the existence and the impact of tax
interactions between countries.1 Much less attention is devoted to the dependence between
regulation and taxes and their interactions in an international context. This is puzzling
because as Oates (2004, p. 377) writes, the ”economic competition among governments
makes use of a wide class of policy instruments including both fiscal and regulatory policies
[...]”. In particular, market regulation imposes costs on the production of goods and services
and impedes the creation of new product varieties. It affects prices, product diversity and,
consequently, consumer surpluses both at home and in foreign markets. As a result, we can
expect interdependencies between the regulatory decisions of trading partners. This paper
aims to fill this gap in the literature.
Importantly, the discussion of product market regulation cannot be disentangled from
the issue of taxation, for two reasons. On the one hand, from an economic viewpoint, each
country’s choice of commodity taxes depends on product market competitiveness, which
is significantly influenced by market regulation. On the other hand, commodity taxation
accounts for 18.9 percent of total government revenues in the OECD countries in 2003
(OECD 2005) and is, therefore, a policy instrument that should not be neglected in economic
analysis. An extensive literature studies the strategic interactions among governments’ taxes
and suggests that competition in commodity taxes is mitigated by the adoption of the
destination principle (Mintz and Tulkens, [25]; Haufler et al, [18], Behrens et al. [5]; see
Lockwood, [23] for a survey). However, the existence of strategic interactions between fiscal
policies and market regulation has not been analyzed.
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, we investigate the existence and the
nature of strategic interactions in commodity taxation under the destination principle, this
regime being the one most widely used in developed countries. Second, we analyze the
existence and nature of the strategic interactions in regulatory settings: does a country’s
decision to weaken its regulatory setting entice trading partners to weaken or strengthen
theirs? Third, we analyze how regulation policies affect commodity tax rates in an interna-
tional context.
To this end, we build a general equilibrium model with endogenous commodity taxes
under the destination principle and with endogenous regulatory restrictions in a product
market subject to monopolistic competition. More specifically, we build a two-country trade
model with immobile individuals who consume private and public goods and work in firms,
and with immobile firms that produce private goods, set prices and freely enter product
markets. Public goods or services are supplied by public agencies. Regulation imposes
1For instance, see Wildasin [30] for a survey of the fiscal competition literature.
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additional costs on firms’ physical fixed costs. Benevolent governments set consumption taxes
while regulators choose the regulation level. We combine two common views on regulation
by assuming that regulators care for both consumers’ welfare and the rents from regulatory
activities. Regulatory requirements are decided before commodity taxation in order to reflect
governments’ greater flexibility in setting tax rates than in restructuring regulatory processes
and standards. While a reform on tax rates often requires specifying a single tax figure on
which parliament votes, regulatory reform involves a long and cumbersome analysis of a
nexus of laws and decrees and raises many industry specific contentions before any vote can
be called.
The model generates three theoretical predictions. First, we show that commodity taxes
are independent instruments under the destination principle. This result is in line with the
literature on commodity tax competition, which finds strategic independence in commod-
ity tax policies under the destination principle, in both perfect and imperfect competitive
settings (see Lockwood, [23] for a survey). Second, regulation has a negative impact on com-
modity tax rates if demand for public goods is more sensitive to income than demand for
private goods. In this case, government lowers its commodity tax when regulation becomes
stricter. Although this action leads to lower public good provision, it benefits consumers
because it ‘neutralizes’ the negative impact of stricter regulation on private consumption.
Finally, we show that regulation polices are strategic complement instruments as long as
consumers do not excessively value product diversity. Under this condition, stronger foreign
regulatory constraints oblige foreign firms to increase their production scale and lead to a
deterioration in the foreign terms of trade. Since this improves domestic terms of trade and
the competitive position of domestic firms, domestic regulators have incentives to strengthen
domestic regulation in order to extract more rents.
In the empirical part of the paper, we investigate our three theoretical predictions us-
ing a unique dataset that combines information on product market regulation, consumption
taxation, institutional characteristics and social preferences, for 21 OECD countries over
the period 1990-2008. We estimate the model under a number of alternative specifications,
accounting for potential endogeneity issues related to simultaneity, reverse causality, and
spatial dependence, which are typical in empirical analyses of policy interactions (Brueck-
ner, [7]). Our baseline measure of product market regulation is the widely used ‘low level’
index which aggregates quantitative and qualitative information on entry barriers (Con-
way and Nicoletti [11]). We proxy consumption tax rates by average effective tax rates on
consumption, following the methodology proposed by Carey and Rabesona [9]. That is,
consumption tax rates are given by each country’s fiscal revenue from consumption taxes
divided by the country’s total consumption. Since we focus on the destination principle, we
exclude tax items that are likely to be affected by application of the origin principle (e.g. ex-
cise taxes) and we choose a weighting matrix that minimizes cross-border shopping between
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countries. The empirical results confirm the absence of commodity tax competition under
the destination principle: domestic VAT policies have no significant effects on foreign ones.
Our empirical results show also that, on average, stronger domestic regulations are associ-
ated with lower local consumption taxes, supporting the view that national governments use
commodity taxes to ‘neutralize’ the negative welfare impact of long-lasting regulation. Fi-
nally, our results also show that, on average, OECD countries reduce domestic regulation in
response to foreign deregulation, i.e., regulation policies are strategic complements. Our es-
timates suggest that medium term decisions regarding local deregulation have an important
impact on a country’s ability to raise consumption taxes.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, it revisits
the theoretical foundation and empirical relevance of international competition in commodity
taxation. The literature offers an extensive theoretical discussion of the welfare impact of
commodity taxation under the destination and origin principles (see Lockwood, [23] for
a survey). It also presents empirical evidence of strategic interactions under the origin
principle. Egger et al. [15] find evidence of strategic complementarity of average effective
tax rates on consumption using OECD panel data. Lockwood and Migali [24] show that the
introduction of the EU Single Market in 1993 triggered strategic interactions among excise
taxes in EU countries. Devereux et al. [12], using US panel data, find evidence of strategic
complementarity of excise taxes on cigarettes. By contrast, the present paper presents
empirical evidence of the absence of strategic interactions in destination-based taxation.
Second, our paper investigates the impact of regulation policy on commodity taxation from
both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. To our knowledge, there are no contribution
in the public economics literature on this issue. There are some studies in environmental
economics such as Oates and Schwab’s [28] discussion of impact of environmental regulations
on taxes and welfare. Third, our paper contributes to the literature analyzing the regulation
of entry and strategic interactions in regulation policy. Djankov et al [14] and Aghion et al.
[1] analyze the social and cultural factors that affect entry regulation. However, these papers
do not look at strategic interactions in regulation policy, which however are investigated in
related fields, e.g. labor economics (e.g. Haaland and Wooton, [16]). A final contribution
of our paper is that it addresses the endogeneity of product market regulation, exploiting
exogenous variation in social norms and values. Recent papers in cultural economics find
strong correlation between measures of ’civicness’ and distrust and product market regulation
(Aghion et al. [1]). To our knowledge, our paper is the first to exploit time variations of
social preferences to identify the impact of product market regulation on economic outcomes.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model, Section 3
studies the strategic interactions in regulation and commodity taxation. Section 4 presents
and discusses our empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The model
We describe a general equilibrium economy with (i) commodity taxation with destination-
principle and (ii) regulatory competition. We therefore assume two countries, home and
foreign, with immobile unit populations. Variables pertaining to the foreign country are
indexed by the superscript *. We describe the model for the domestic country, symmetric
expressions holding for the foreign one.
Private good demand In the domestic country, consumers’ preferences are given by
an increasing, separable, and concave utility function U(C,G) where C is the bundle of
private commodities and G the public good consumption, respectively. The bundle of private
commodities is defined over the varieties ω ∈ [0, N ] such that:
C = N ξ
￿￿ N
0
c(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
￿ σ
σ−1
, (1)
where c(ω) is the private consumption of variety ω and σ, σ > 1, is the elasticity of sub-
stitution among varieties. The world number of varieties, N , is given by the sum of the
endogenous numbers of domestic and foreign varieties, n and n∗. That is, N = n + n∗. As
in Benassy (1996), the parameter ξ ∈ [−1/ (σ − 1) , 0] measures the love for variety.2 Each
consumer chooses her private consumption c(·) subject to her budget constraint￿ N
0
p(ω)c(ω)dω = W,
where p(ω) is the domestic (tax-inclusive) consumer price for variety ω and W is the con-
sumer’s income. Hence, her demand for each variety is given by
c(ω) =
￿
p(ω)
P
￿−σ W
P
, (2)
where P =
￿￿ N
0 p(ω)
1−σdω
￿ 1
1−σ
is the domestic consumer price index.
Public good supply and demand The public good G is supplied by a unit mass of
symmetric public agencies. Without loss of generality, we assume that each public agency
transforms the existing private varieties ω ∈ [0, N ] into the public good G. All public
agencies produce the same amounts of G with a production function given by:
G = N ξ
￿￿ N
0
q(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
￿ σ
σ−1
,
2There is no love for variety if ξ = −1/ (σ − 1) while love for variety is the same as the elasticity of
substitution if ξ = 0. With ξ = 0, one recovers the well-known Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework.
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where q(ω) is the public agency’s input demand for variety ω.3 Each public agency chooses
its input mix that maximizes the level of its public good given its budget constraint,￿ N
0 p(ω)q(ω)dω = B, where B is the government’s budget. Public agencies take prices,
taxes and regulation as given. It naturally comes that the input demand is given by
q(ω) =
￿
p(ω)
P
￿−σ B
P
. (3)
Public and private consumptions are proportionate. Indeed, one can check that
q(ω)/c(ω) = B/w G/C=B/w. (4)
Private production Each private firm has a production plant in a country and sell its
products in the two countries under monopolistic competition. To be profitable, each variety
must be produced by one and only one firm. Thus, firms can be indexed by ω ∈ [0, N ]. A
domestic firm ω has a profit given by
π(ω) =
￿
p(ω)
τ
−W
￿
[c(ω) + q(ω)] +
￿
p∗(ω)
τ ∗
−W
￿
[c∗(ω) + q∗(ω)]− fW,
where p(ω) and p∗(ω) are its domestic and foreign prices, c(ω) and q(ω) are the demands
from domestic private consumers and public agencies while c∗(ω) and q∗(ω) are the demand
by foreign consumers and public agencies. To produce a unit of the good a firm must
hire a unit of labor paying a wage equal to W . She must as well incur a set up cost Wf
where f is the fixed labor input that is induced by the regulatory policies. For the sake of
exposition, we measure domestic and foreign commodity taxes by the ratio between (tax-
inclusive) consumer and (tax-exclusive) factory prices: τ > 1 and τ ∗ > 1. Commodity tax
rates are simply equal to τ − 1 and τ ∗ − 1. Taxes follow the destination principle and are
set by governments.
Under monopolistic competition, each firm ω sets the domestic and foreign prices, p(ω)
and p∗(ω) that maximize its profit taking all other variables as given. The optimal prices
are given by
p (ω) =
σ
σ − 1τW and p
∗ (ω) =
σ
σ − 1τ
∗W. (5)
Under monopolistic competition, firms also enter until profits fall to zero. In the domestic
country, the above prices imply that each firm’s production scale x is equal to
x = (σ − 1) f, (6)
which increases with setup costs. Similar expressions hold for the foreign country.
3In this model, public agencies basically use outsourcing and procurement to supply the public good. A
large share of public infrastructures and services are supplied in this way. Furthermore, this approach yields
analytical tractability. Similar results can be obtained using a public good provision produced with public
labor and under constant returns to scale.
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Plugging optimal prices into the price indices we get the following property:
P
τ
=
P ∗
τ ∗
=
σ
σ − 1
￿
nW 1−σ + n∗W
∗1−σ￿ 11−σ . (7)
The cost of living is the same across countries once they are deflated by local commodity
tax rates.
Labor and product market equilibrium In the domestic country, each firm demands
x + f = fσ units of labor and the labor market clears when the total labor demand nfσ
equalizes its unit supply. Applying the same argument for the foreign country we get the
following number of firms
n =
1
σf
and n∗ =
1
σf ∗
. (8)
In each country, the number of firms is proportional to the labor force because they operate
at the same production scale. Because of (6), setting the domestic regulatory entry cost f is
equivalent to setting the domestic production scale and, ultimately, the number of domestic
firms, n. For this reason, in the rest of the paper the choice of regulation is treated as the
choice of the number of firms in country.
For each domestic firm ω, the product supply x must satisfy the product demand: x =
c(ω) + q(ω) + c∗(ω) + q∗(ω). Using (2) and (3), this equality can be written as
x =
￿
p(ω)
P
￿−σ W +B
P
+
￿
p∗(ω)
P ∗
￿−σ W ∗ +B∗
P ∗
.
Then, using (5) and (7), we obtain
x = W−σ
σ − 1
σ
(W +B) τ−1 + (W ∗ +B∗) τ ∗−1
nW 1−σ + n∗W ∗1−σ
,
where the ratios on the right hand side are the same in both countries. As a result, given
the production scale (6), wages satisfy
W
W ∗
=
￿ x
x∗
￿− 1σ
=
￿
f
f ∗
￿− 1σ
. (9)
The relative wage falls with larger domestic production scales and therefore with larger
domestic setup costs and stronger regulation. Indeed, when setup costs rise, domestic firms
need to sell more to break even and therefore set a lower relative price. Since firms set
constant markups over marginal costs and therefore wages, domestic firms can achieve a
profit balance only when their relative wages fall. Ceteris paribus, a too strong regulation
diminishes domestic prices and thus workers’ real wages and consumption. This is the effect
of product market regulation on the domestic purchasing power, or equivalently, on the
domestic terms of trade, W/W ∗.
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Government balance and consumer utility The government balances its tax revenues
against its expenditures on public inputs. The value of the sales to domestic agents is equal
to the domestic consumers’ and government’s expenditures, W + B. Thus, the value of
those sales before tax is given by (W +B) /τ and the domestic tax revenue is equal to
(τ − 1) (W +B) /τ . Equating the latter to the government’s budget B yields
B = W (τ − 1) . (10)
The equalities (6), (8) and (10) characterize the equilibrium in the product and labor markets
and for a balanced budget. We can now compute the private and public consumption. The
private consumption bundle is given by (1) and simplifies to
C =
W
P
N ξ, (11)
and from (4) the public good consumption is equal to
G = (B/W )C = (τ − 1)C. (12)
The consumption of private and public goods increase with real wages W/P . Using (7) and
(9) real wages are given by
W
P
=
σ − 1
σ
1
τ
￿
n+
￿ n
n∗
￿1− 1σ
n∗
￿ 1
σ−1
, (13)
where n, n∗ and N = n+n∗ are given by (8). It is easy to check that taxes affect negatively
the level of private consumption because they negatively affect real wages (see (11) and (13)).
By contrast, a tax increase leads to a larger supply of public goods. Indeed, substituting
(11) and (13) in (12) one readily finds that ∂G/∂τ > 0.
To check how private and public good consumption change with the number of goods
produced domestically we substitute (13) in (11) and find
C =
1
τ
C0(n, n
∗) (14)
where
C0(n, n
∗) ≡ σ − 1
σ
￿
n+
￿ n
n∗
￿1− 1σ
n∗
￿ 1
σ−1
(n+ n∗)ξ
is the consumption level in the absence of tax, which is a function of n and n∗ only. It follows
that G = C0 (τ − 1) /τ .
A stronger domestic regulation diminishes the level of domestic diversity n and therefore
changes the utility from private consumption through two channels. On the one hand, it
reduces the terms of tradeW/W ∗, which reduces the term (n/n∗)1−1/σ in the above expression
and therefore domestic consumers’ utility. On the other hand, it reduces product diversity
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and diminishes the utility from private consumption to the extent of the consumers’ taste for
variety, ξ. When consumers express the same love variety as under Stiglitz-Dixit preferences
(ξ = 0), stronger regulation makes consumers worse off both because of a lower product
diversity and worse terms of trade. However, things may slightly differ when consumers
express no taste for variety (ξ = −1/(σ − 1)). To show this, we compute the elasticity of
private consumption with respect to n as follows:
∂ lnC0
∂ lnn
≡ Φ
￿ n
n∗
￿
=
1
(σ − 1)
￿
1− 1
σ
1
1 + (n/n∗)
1
σ
￿
+ ξ
1
1 + (n/n∗)−1
. (15)
When consumers have love for variety (ξ = 0), this elasticity is obviously positive so that a
rise in product diversity raises the domestic utility from private consumption. Instead, when
ξ = −1/(σ − 1), the sign of this elasticity depends on the balance between the effects of
terms of trade and product diversity. Its sign is positive if n/n∗ does not lie too high above
1.4 In this case, the terms of trade dominate the effect of product diversity. In the present
model, this will be the most relevant case. By contrast, the sign of this elasticity can be
negative if the ratio n/n∗ becomes large enough. In this case, a rise in domestic product
diversity diminishes the utility from domestic private consumption.
We are now equipped to discuss the strategic interactions between governments and
regulators.
3 Strategic interactions between governments and reg-
ulators
In this paper, we consider government and regulatory agencies as independent entities. More-
over, we take the view that regulatory processes and standards are less easy to restructure
than commodity tax rates. Whereas a reform on the tax rate requires to specify a single tax
figure on which parliament must vote, a regulation reform requires a long and cumbersome
analysis of a nexus of laws and decrees and raises many industry specific contentions before
any vote can be called for. We therefore model the interaction between government and reg-
ulators as a sequential game in which regulators firstly set the firms’ entry requirements and
then governments set their commodity tax rates. The game is solved by backward induction.
We assume that each government is benevolent and maximizes its residents’ utility
whereas each regulator has two facets: he cares for consumers’ welfare but also for his
own rents. This provides a partial reconciliation of the two extreme views on bureaucracy.
4The elasticity ∂ lnC0/∂ lnn is non-negative if σ (n/n∗)
1
σ − (n/n∗) ≥ 1 − σ. This condition holds for
n/n∗ = 1 when countries have symmetric population sizes as in this model. The condition will not hold for
very asymmetric population sizes so that n/n∗ is very large.
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On the one hand, as in standard public economics, the regulator is benevolent in that it cares
about the level of utility of the citizen. On the other hand, the bureaucrat has a Leviathan
side aiming at increasing its own rents. More specifically, we assume that regulators weights
their own rent and the residents’ welfare when deciding the level of regulations.
We begin with the analysis of the governments’ competition in commodity taxes.
3.1 Commodity tax competition
Each government sets the commodity tax rate that maximizes its residents’ utility, holding a
balanced budget and taking the other tax and the regulatory setting as given. In particular
the domestic government maximizes U(C,G) or equivalently U [C0/τ, C0(τ − 1)/τ)]. Because
C0 is a function of only n and n∗, the optimal domestic commodity tax τ is independent of
the foreign tax. We can then state then the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under the destination tax principle, there exists no strategic interaction in
commodity tax rates.
This is a known result in optimum taxation theory under the destination tax principle.5
Indeed, in their seminal paper, Mintz and Tulkens [25] show the absence of commodity tax
competition under the destination principle in perfectly competitive markets. Haufler et
al., [18] obtain the same result in imperfectly competitive markets where firms are perfectly
mobile and sell their goods under monopolistic competition. The present paper confirms
such a result in a similar monopolistic competition model. In contrast to Haufler et al. [18],
it gives a role to taxation as the provision of public goods, considers the taxation of all goods
and does not use firms’ mobility as a factor that cancels fiscal externalities.
The choice of commodity taxes can readily be obtained and understood by reformulating
the government’s problem in the following way. Since C = C0/τ and G = C0(τ − 1)/τ ,
we get C + G = C0. So, the government’s problem is simply to find the private and public
consumption bundles that maximize each individual’s utility U(C,G) subject to the resource
constraint C +G = C0. This yields the standard Samuelson condition
U ￿C/U
￿
G = 1 (16)
according to which the sum (over the unit mass consumers) of the marginal rate of substi-
tution between public and private goods, U ￿C/U
￿
G, equates the unit marginal rate of trans-
formation between public and private goods. The optimal tax rate is given by τ − 1 = G/C.
A maximum is guaranteed under our standard concavity assumptions.
5For a synthesis of the literature see Lockwood [23].
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What is the impact of domestic regulation on domestic tax rates? It depends on income
effects associated to public and private goods. Stronger regulation indeed decreases the num-
ber of domestic firms n and therefore reduces the private consumption bundle C0(n, n∗) if
and only if ∂ lnC0/∂ lnn > 0. Suppose it is the case. Then, stronger regulation yields a con-
traction of the resource constraint C +G = C0(n, n∗). In consumer theory, this corresponds
to a fall in the income of a representative consumer whose income is given by C0(n, n∗) and
who faces the identical prices for private and public consumption bundles. Then, suppose
that the income effect on the demand of public goods is stronger than that on private goods.
That is, the income expansion path or Engel function is biased toward public goods. Then a
fall in resource or income must diminish the optimal consumption of public goods more than
that of private goods. To achieve this, the government simply has to reduce the commodity
tax rate. If the income effects go in opposite directions, the converse result obtains.
More formally, the domestic commodity tax falls with a smaller number of domestic
firms if dτ/dn = − (dF/dn) / (dF/dτ) ≥ 0 where F ≡ (d/dτ)U [C0/τ, C0(τ − 1)/τ)] is the
first order condition with respect to τ and where dF/dτ < 0 is the respective second order
condition. Then, dτ/dn > 0 ⇐⇒ dF/dn ≥ 0. Some lines of computation show that this
condition is equivalent to
[U ￿￿GG(τ − 1)− U ￿￿CC ]
∂ lnC0
∂ lnn
≥ 0,
where U ￿￿CC and U
￿￿
GG are negative. The last expression clearly depends on the response of
domestic private consumption bundle C0 to n and on the concavity of the utility function
with respect to private and public goods (C and G) and therefore on the degree of consumers’
satiety for those two kinds of goods. The above condition can be expressed in terms of the
marginal rates of substitution, MRS ≡ U ￿C/U ￿G, as￿
d lnMRS
d lnC
+
d lnMRS
d lnG
￿
∂ lnC0
∂ lnn
≥ 0
The term in parenthesis expresses the income effects on marginal rates of substitution.
Indeed, take any ray, G/C =cst, on which private and public consumptions are proportionate
(d lnC = d lnG). When income effects on public and private goods are the same, the
marginal rate of substitution remains constant on the ray. Changes in regulation and thus
in number of domestic firms have no impact on commodity tax rates. When income effects
are stronger on the demand of public goods, marginal rates of substitution increase on this
ray when consumptions rise proportionally so that the term in parenthesis becomes positive.
A a result, a stronger regulation reduces the number of domestic firms and thus increases
commodity taxes. This is what have informally explained in the previous paragraph.
We summarize our findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose that private consumption increases with the number of domestic
varieties (∂C0/∂n > 0). Then, a stronger product market regulation lowers commodity tax
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rates if and only if income has a stronger effect on the demand of public goods than on that
of private goods.
Empirically, the concavity of preferences, the marginal rates of substitution for private
and public goods and the income effect on demand depend on the nature of each good. To
our knowledge, the public economic literature has not identified clear and distinct patterns
about those properties on private and public goods. The direction of commodity tax changes
with respect to the number of firms and market deregulation is therefore an empirical issue
that we will discuss in Section 4.
3.2 Regulatory competition
In this section, we discuss the governments’ interactions through their regulatory policies.
From the previous section, we know that optimal commodity tax rates are independent
instruments. Therefore, any change of domestic regulation implies a change of the foreign
tax only from its impact on the number of local and foreign firms. For the sake of simplicity,
we sterilize the effect of local regulation on local tax by assuming that the utility function
of agents is log-linear, i.e., U(C,G) = α lnC + (1− α) lnG, where α is the specific domestic
preference for private consumption. This utility function allows us to discuss the regulatory
competition stage. Under this assumption, the optimal commodity tax rate is equal to
τ0 = 1/α. The utility becomes V (C) = lnC0 + ln
￿
αα (1− α)1−α￿. Similarly, the foreign
country sets a tax τ ∗0 = 1/α
∗.
We assume that domestic regulators follow an objective that mixes the consumers’ utility
and their own rents. That is, their objective function is given by V (C) + Z (R) where Z is
an increasing and concave function and R is the real rent they grab from their activities. For
simplicity, we consider that regulators get a rent by extracting and adding an extra input z
on the fixed input cost f0 of a subset of firms that has a constant mass equal to m. The idea
is that although the regulation applies to all firms in the country, regulators are able to grab
a rent only in a limited number of firms with which they interact more often. Regulators
therefore collect an income wz per controlled firm times the number of controlled firms m.
They get a nominal rent of mzw which gives to them a consumption equal to R = mzC.
The input required for entry becomes f = f0 + z so that, by (8), z = 1/ (σn) − f0. In this
setup, rents should be positive and the number of firm no smaller than the number of firms
under control m. That is, we assume that the condition, 1/(f0σ) ≥ n ≥ m, holds.
Domestic regulators therefore choose the regulatory setup that maximizes V (C) +Z (R)
where R = mzC and C = C0(n, n∗)/τ0. This amounts to choose the number of domestic
firms n. The first order condition with respect to n can be written as
[CV ￿ +RZ ￿]
∂ lnC0
∂ lnn
= −RZ ￿ ∂ ln z
∂ lnn
. (17)
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Regulators balance their cost that this regulation imposes to society and to themselves (the
left hand side) with the benefit from their rent from a stronger regulation (the right hand
side). This cost increases with the elasticity of domestic consumption to domestic variety,
∂ lnC0/∂ lnn. An increase in domestic variety indeed increases the utility of both domestic
consumers and regulators.
For analytical tractability, we set now Z (R) ≡ ρ lnR where ρ is the weight regulators
put on their own benefit. Domestic regulators therefore choose the regulatory setup that
satisfies (17), which becomes
1 + ρ
ρ
(1− f0σn) ∂ lnC0
∂ lnn
= 1. (18)
Differentiating totally the first order condition (18) and using (15) we obtain
d lnn
d lnn∗
=
n
n∗
￿
1− f0σ
1− nf0σ
Φ
Φ￿
￿−1
, (19)
where Φ is defined in (15) and Φ￿ is as follows:
Φ￿ (n/n∗) =
1
σ2 (σ − 1) (n/n
∗)
1
σ−1
￿
1
1 + (n/n∗)
1
σ
￿2
+ ξ
￿
1
1 + n/n∗
￿2
.
When (19) is positive, domestic regulators increase n by reducing domestic regulation when
foreign competitors do the same. At any symmetric equilibrium with ρ = ρ∗ and f0 = f0∗
and n/n∗ = 1, using (18), we get:
d lnn
d lnn∗
> 0 ⇐⇒ ρ
f0σ (1 + ρ)
≥ Φ
2(1)
Φ￿(1)
=
(2σ − 1 + ξσ (σ − 1))2
(σ − 1) (1 + ξσ2 (σ − 1)) . (20)
Let ρˆ be the solution of the last inequality when it binds. Then, the following proposition
can be stated:
Proposition 3 Suppose two symmetric countries and log linear utility functions. (i) For
low enough love for product diversity (ξ < −1/σ2(σ − 1)) regulation policies are strategic
complement instruments for any regulator’s preference for rent ρ. (ii) For large enough love
for variety (ξ > −1/σ2(σ − 1)) and low f0 (f0 < (σ − 1) /(σ (2σ − 1)2)), regulations are
strategic complement instruments if regulators have sufficiently strong preferences for rents
(ρ > ρˆ). Otherwise, regulation policies are strategic substitutes.
Proof. To prove (i) in Proposition 3, we sign the denominator (σ − 1) (1 + ξσ2 (σ − 1)) ,
which is always negative when ξ < −1/σ2 (σ − 1) . Hence, if ξ < −1/σ2 (σ − 1) , then
d lnn/d lnn∗ > 0. When instead ξ > −1/σ2 (σ − 1) (the case in (ii)) and moreover
f0 < (σ − 1) /(σ (2σ − 1)2), then d lnn/d lnn∗ > 0 if ρ > ρˆ. Otherwise (namely either
if ξ > 1/σ2 (σ − 1) and f0 < (σ − 1) /(σ (2σ − 1)2) and ρ < ρˆ or if ξ > 1/σ2 (σ − 1) and
f0 > (σ − 1) /(σ (2σ − 1)2)) d lnn/d lnn∗ < 0.
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The intuition of Proposition 3 is as follows. When regulators and consumers do not value
product diversity, local regulation increases local fixed input and obliges local firms to expand
their production, which negatively affects local wages and the local terms of trade. As a
consequence, when foreign regulators relax regulatory pressure, the terms of trade becomes
unfavorable to domestic regulators, which have incentives to relax domestic regulation to
restore their purchasing power. Regulatory decisions are strategic complements. By contrast,
when regulators and consumers value product diversity, domestic regulators are harmed by
their own regulation as the latter reduces domestic and therefore global diversity. An increase
in the foreign product diversity however reduces the impact of domestic regulation on the
utility derived from domestic consumption. As a result, the relaxation of foreign regulation
entices the domestic regulators to enhance regulatory constraints and their rents. Regulatory
decisions then become strategic substitutes. To sum up, when consumers have low taste for
variety, regulation policies are strategic complements because regulations affect mainly the
terms of trade. Conversely, when consumers have high taste for variety, regulation policies
are strategic substitutes because they affect product diversity in a country.
Before testing empirically the nature of regulatory competition, it is worth to note that
existing empirical studies have already shown that consumer’s “love of variety” is significantly
lower than what it is assumed in the Dixit-Stiglitz framework (see Hummels and Klenow
[21] and Ardelan [4]).
4 Empirical evidence
4.1 Empirical strategy
In this section, we estimate the direction of the forces described in the theoretical setup. We
build an empirical model in which tax and regulation decisions are taken sequentially in two
stages by several countries over some time periods. The best reply functions obtained in the
tax stage determine the link between taxation and regulation. The empirical specification
is a generalization (in a linearized form) of the optimal tax rates that solve equation (16)
when the origin or destination taxation principle is not specified:
τit =
￿
j ￿=i
aijτjt + bzit−2 + c
￿
Xit + di + et + uit, (21)
where i = 1, ..., I denotes the country, t = 1, ..., T the time-period, di and et are country and
time dummies, Xit is the vector of relevant characteristics of country i at time t, including
factors describing national consumption patterns, and finally uit is the error term. Coeffi-
cients aij measure how the consumption tax in country i responds to the consumption tax in
each country j ￿= i at time t. According to Proposition 1 strategic interactions in commodity
taxation are absent. A significant aij = 0 would provide no evidence of strategic interactions
14
and confirm our theoretical analysis as well as previous studies on the destination principle
of commodity taxation (see Lockwood [23] for a synthesis). Coefficient b describes how gov-
ernment’s tax policy reacts to product market regulation zjt−2, where j = 1, ..., I. The use
of a lag reflects our theoretical priors: the implementation of the regulation policy is time
consuming, due to the difficulties encountered in restructuring regulatory processes. Thus
current taxes are determined by past regulation.6 According to our theoretical model, a
significant b < 0 would indicate that the government uses commodity taxes to mitigate the
negative impact of regulation on consumers’ welfare.
In the first stage of the model, entry regulation is selected anticipating and internalizing
its effect on consumptions taxes. Hence, from condition (17), regulator i’s best reply to
the regulation set by partner countries j = 1, ..., I is a function zi = F (z−i, Yi), where
z−i = [z1, ..., zi−1, zi+1, ...zI ] is a vector of regulations in each partner country j ￿= i and Yit
is a vector of relevant country characteristics. These include country specific factors that
determine the national patterns in public and private consumption as well as regulator’s
preferences. We can make a linear approximation of F (z−i, Yi) and generalize it for T time
periods as follows:
zit =
￿
j ￿=i
αijzjt + β
￿Yit + γi + δt + µit. (22)
where γi and δt are country and time dummies and µit is the error term. The coefficients αij
measure how zi responds to zj: αij > 0 (< 0) indicates that country i’s regulation policy is
a strategic complement (substitute) of country j’s regulation.
Degrees of freedom Equations (21) and (22) cannot be estimated as there are too many
parameters. The usual approach is to modify them as follows:
τit = aτ−it + bzit−2 + c
￿
Xit + di + et + uit, (23)
zit = αz−it + β￿Yit + γi + δt + µit; (24)
where τ−it =
￿
j ￿=i ωijτjt and z−it =
￿
j ￿=i ωijzjt are indices of trade partners’ tax and reg-
ulation policies. Those indices are constructed with the nonnegative exogenous weights
ωij, normalized so that
￿
j ￿=i ωij = 1. There is considerable discussion on the appropriate
weights in the literature, as their choice affects the magnitude of the coefficients of interest
(see Brueckner, [7]). The idea is to construct z−i and τ−i by aggregating the foreign vari-
ables according to the relevance of each country j’s interaction with country i. Based on our
6By taking a two year lag we make the implicit assumption that it takes two years to actually implement
a product market reform. This is consistent with descriptive evidence for OECD countries (see Conway et
al. [11] and World Bank’s Doing Business reports [31]-[34]).
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theoretical model, we need to focus on the destination principle and exclude strategic inter-
actions that stem from cross-border shopping. Thus, we construct weights that describe the
exogenous country i’s propensity to import from country j, as predicted by the structural
characteristics of countries such as size, distance, culture, legal origin and historical relation-
ship (see Appendix A for details). This approach contrasts with existing papers that choose
contiguity weights to highlight strategic interaction between governments in origin based
commodity taxation (e.g. Lockwood and Migali [24], Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano
[12]).
Endogeneity As regulation and taxation levels in equations (23) and (24) are the outcome
of spatially correlated policy decisions, OLS estimates of a, b and α are subject to endogeneity
issues. There is a first problem of simultaneity that stems from strategic interactions between
countries. There is a second issue of reverse causality in equation (23) in so far as the
regulators might rather set regulation as a function of prevailing taxes instead of setting
their taxes as a function of their regulatory environments as assumed in our study. There is
a third problem of omitted variable bias as τit, zit, τ−it and z−it may be affected by common
unobserved shocks. In our context for instance, we have ‘spatial error dependence’ as the
error terms in (23) and (24) may include omitted country characteristics that are spatially
correlated. As Brueckner [7] notes, ignoring spatial dependence implies that the estimated
coefficients may provide false evidence of strategic interactions.
We solve endogeneity issues by means of an instrumental variables (IV) estimator. We
use regulator’s preferences as an instrument for regulation. In fact regulator’s preferences
determine the local regulation while we do not expect any correlation with either local com-
modity tax policy nor foreign regulation. Let ri be the proxy of regulator’s preferences in
country i, then E[rizi] ￿= 0 while E[riτi] = 0 and E[r−izi] = 0. These conditions for instance
hold in our model with log-linear utility functions. To instrument for foreign taxation in
equation (23), we exploit the exogenous variation associated with each country’s trading
partners that have implemented at least one of two structural commodity tax reform that
occurred over the sample period. These are the switch from a consumption-based to a VAT-
based system of commodity taxation, and the implementation of the 1993 VAT reform by
countries belonging to the EU.7 The 1993 VAT reform originated from a common agree-
ment among EU countries that kept the destination principle for firms’ transactions and
applied the origin principle to cross-border shopping. As shown by Lockwood and Migali
[24], cross-border shopping represents a direct effect of the reform in a country on com-
7The switch to the VAT entails the adoption of a relatively more efficient system of consumption taxation,
which ensures higher tax compliance and avoids double marginalization (OECD Consumption Tax Trends
[26]). Conversely the 1993 VAT reform introduces a different VAT treatment of domestic and cross-border
supplies that creates incentives to smuggling and tax avoidance practices (see Lockwood and Migali [24]).
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modity tax revenue of the neighboring countries. As the presence of cross-border shopping
could invalidate our identification strategy, we firstly use a definition of the consumption
tax variable that minimizes the set of transactions subject to the application of the origin
principle (see more below) and we secondly choose a weighting matrix ω that minimizes
cross-border shopping effects. These two empirical strategies allow us to isolate the goods
sold under the destination principle. Under the destination principle, both reforms are asso-
ciated with an exogenous change in local commodity tax revenues but not on the commodity
tax revenues of the partner countries. To sum up, we can then estimate equations (23) and
(24) by instrumental variables and use the set of instruments described above to predict the
endogenous regressors in the first stage. The predicted values ￿zit−2, ￿τ−it and ￿z−it are then
used in the second stage equations (23) and (24) to obtain consistent estimates ￿aIV , ￿bIV and￿αIV , respectively.
4.2 Data and main variables
We construct a unique dataset that combines information on product market regulation, con-
sumption taxation, institutional characteristics and social preferences for 21 OECD countries
over the period 1990-2008.8 Our primary measure of product market regulation is the En-
ergy, Transport and Communication Regulation indicator (ETCR) drawn from the OECD
International Regulation Database (IRD; see Conway and Nicoletti [11]). We focus on the
low-level ETCR index that aggregates over a 0 to 6 scale qualitative and quantitative in-
formation on entry barriers (fixed costs) in seven non-manufacturing industries: electricity,
gas, air passenger transport, rail transport, road freight, and postal services.9 We proxy the
consumption tax rate by the (implicit) average effective tax rate on consumption (CTAX ),
which measures consumption tax revenues as a percentage of total consumption. We con-
struct CTAX using Carey and Rabesona [9]’s methodology on data from the OECD National
Accounts and Revenue Statistics. As we want to focus on destination based commodity tax-
ation, the CTAX definition includes only sales and value added taxes. In other words, we
exclude excise taxes, customs and import duties, profits from fiscal monopolies and taxes
in specific services, whose revenues may partly reflect the application of the origin principle
to consumers’ transactions.10 We finally construct the average measure of product market
8The countries we consider are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom and the United States.
9Conway and Nicoletti [11] distinguish the low-level ETCR index disaggregated by type of regulation
(entry barriers, public ownership, vertical integration) from the aggregate ETCR index which is a weighted
average of the low level indicators.
10In contrast, existing studies adopt definitions of commodity taxes that (at least partly) reflect the
application of the origin principle. For instance, Egger et al. [15] computes the implicit average effective
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regulation of each country’s trade partners, ETCRTP , and the average effective consump-
tion tax rate of each country’s trade partners CTAX TP . These are computed as averages of
ETCR and CTAX of each country’s trade partners, weighted by the propensity to import
from that specific country, ω.
To proxy regulator’s preferences, we use data from two international social surveys, the
World Value Survey (WVS) and the European Value Study (EVS). The first indicator (Or-
derNation) is the percentage of individuals who responded ’maintaining order in nation’ to
the question: ‘There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be
for the next ten years, ..., If you had to choose, which of the things on this card would you say
is most important? ’. As suggested by Inglehart [22], OrderNation captures the perception
that regulators behave in the interest of their citizens, describing the extent to which the
society is inspired by social values, emphasizing the importance of economic and physical
security, relative to economic freedom and autonomy. The second indicator (DisTrust) is the
percentage of respondents who answered ‘Can’t be too careful ’ to the question: ‘Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful
in dealing with people? ’. Aghion et al. [1] propose DisTrust as a basic measure to cap-
ture the perception about regulator’s propensity to adopt a rent seeking behavior. Again,
we construct the proxies for average preferences of trade partners’ regulators (DisTrustTP ,
OrderNationTP ) weighting DisTrust and OrderNation by ω.
In contrast to previous works on the impact of trust and social norms on institutions that
exploit only cross-country variation (see Algan and Cahuc [3] for a notable exception), we are
able to construct consistent time-varying measures of preferences for regulation, since WVS
and EVS data consist of fully comparable survey waves. In fact, we use the last four waves
of the WVS and three waves of the EVS and take country averages of the two indicators over
the periods 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-08. Under the assumption that social values
and preferences have a persistent component that makes their evolution over time very slow,
each wave provides the description of individual tastes, preferences and ideologies in each
country over the covered period. In other words, it can be assumed that social preferences
for regulation change between two periods while remain constant within each period.
We construct a dummy variable VAT that equals one if a country adopts a VAT-based
system and a dummy variable EUVAT93 that equals 1 if a country is exposed to the EU
VAT reform in 1993. These two dummies are used to construct our two instruments for
consumption taxes, VAT TP and EUVAT93 TP . They measure the share of each country’s
trade partners that implemented each reform, weighted by ω. VAT and EUVAT93 exhibit
tax rate on consumption that accounts also for excise taxes, customs and import duties, profits from fiscal
monopolies and taxes in specific services. Devereux et al [12] and Lockwood and Migali [24] focus on excise
taxation.
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a sufficient variation in our sample to ensure identification.11 An even higher variation is
shown by EUVAT93 TP and VAT TP since each country has a different number of trading
partners that implemented each reform.
In Appendix A we provide more details over the construction of our variables of interest
and describe the additional variables used as controls and in the robustness checks. These
variables come from multiple sources: the OECD Economic Outlook; the World Bank’s
‘Database on Political Institutions’ (DPI), ‘World Development Indicators’ (WDI) and Do-
ing Businness (DOBUS); the International Monetary Fund’s ‘Direction of Trade Statistics’
(DOTS); the CEPII Gravity Dataset (CEPII).
4.3 Descriptive statistics
In Figure 1, we plot the effective tax rate on consumption in each country against entry
barriers, taken in differences between the final period’s level (i.e., 2004/08) and the ini-
tial period’s level (i.e., 1990/94). All countries in the sample present an overall negative
variation in the ETCR indicator during the period 1990-2008. More specifically, when we
compare the product market deregulation efforts of each country, a distinction emerges be-
tween low, intermediate and high reformers. The low reformers’ group includes countries
that experienced a reduction of ETCR by less than 2 points. These are USA, UK, and
Canada that implemented deregulation waves before the 1990s, thus entering the sample
already with a low overall level of product market regulation.12 The intermediate reformers’
group include countries that present a deregulation pace very close to the OECD median.
These are countries whose reform efforts started generally in the mid-eighties (as in Swe-
den, Finland, Norway and Australia) plus some contries from Continental Europe whose
reforms concentrated after 1995 (Austria, Belgium, Switzerland). The high reformers’ group
includes countries that cut ETCR by more than 3.5 points. These are mostly EU countries
that were heavily regulated until the 1995, boosting the pace of their reforms afterwards
due to the incentives provided by the EU deregulation directives (Conway and Nicoletti,
[11]). The figure displays a negative correlation between changes in taxes and changes in
product market regulation: high reformers experienced an increase in average effective tax
rates during the period 1990-2008, with the only exception of France. Conversely, none of
the low reformers increased average effective tax rates. In Spain, Portugal, Japan, and more
11Identification of EUVAT93TP is guaranteed by cross-country and over time variation among countries
exposed and not exposed to the 1993 VAT reform. This is basically cross-country variation among coun-
tries that in 1993 were EU and non-EU as well as over time variation for EU countries before and after
1993. Identification of VAT is guaranteed by the four countries switching to VAT during the sample period
(Australia, Canada, Switzerland and Finland).
12The USA started its reform process early in the mid-seventies and carried most of its reforms in the
period 1975-1985. Canada, and UK instead concentrated their reforms in the period 1985-1995.
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recently, Switzerland and Australia, the rise of the average effective tax rates also reflects
the introduction and consolidation of a VAT system (see OECD [26]).
In Figure 2, we show the correlation between each country’s average regulation and
the trading partners’ weighted average regulation. The weights are chosen according the
procedure described in the previous section. Also in this case we take differences between
the 2004/08 level and the 1990/94 level. All countries are close to the top-right and the
bottom-left quadrants of Figure 2. This indicates that the trading partners of high reformers
are high reformers themselves on average, and similarly trading partners of low reformers are
low reformers themselves. While being purely descriptive, this evidence is consistent with
the view that trade partners deregulate in response to each others’ deregulation waves, i.e.,
that regulation policies among trading partners arestrategic complements.
In Figure 3, we look in detail at the correlation between OrderNation and DisTrust.
Also in this case we take the two variables in differences between the final period’s level (i.e.,
2004/08) and the initial period’s level (i.e., 1990/94). The two variables display a consider-
able variation over time. Trust and preference for order in nation in fact evolve over time as
a consequence of exogenous shocks or feedback effects from past policies/reforms (Aghion
et al. [1]; Algan and Cahuc [2]; Inglehart [22]). The time interval covered in our sample
(1990-2008) is long enough to describe such an evolution in a period with several political,
social and economic changes. With these respect, we clearly distinguish four groups of coun-
tries. The first group includes Finland, Belgium and Sweden that in 1990-2008 experienced
increasing distrust (particularly Belgium and Finland) and demanded more security due to
social, political and economic unrest.13 The second group includes Anglo-Saxon countries
(USA, UK, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and Australia) and Japan. These countries did
not see a relevant rise in the demand for order in nation, probably due to their traditionally
liberal views. However they experienced a significant rise of social distrust, probably created
by the rising inequalities and the fears of terrorism. Two relevant exceptions in the group
of Anglo-Saxon countries are New Zealand and Australia, which in the last two decades
experienced increasing levels of trust mostly related to the successful political turnover and
structural reforms implemented during the 1990s.14 The third group includes Continental
13In Finland the rise of social equality movements and the constrast with the Swedish minorities by the
end of 1980s increased social unrest. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing great
economic depression of the first half of the 1990s increased the demand for social, political and economic
stabilization. Similarly, in Belgium the gradual concentration of the political power around the need to
represent the main cultural communities increased political and social polarization and the needs for political
stabilization.
14At the beginning of the 1990s, Australia started from very low levels of trust mostly driven by political
inertia and economic depression. The increase in trust is probably related to the election of a new liberal
government which launched successful waves of liberalizations and structural reforms. A somehow similar
path was experienced by New Zealand where up to the early 1990s national governments carried out reforms
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and Southern-EU countries (France, Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal).
In the last twenty years these countries experienced a resurgence of distrust and national-
ism, while their mediocre economic performance boosted public support for freedom and
autonomy in the private sector.15 The fourth group includes Denmark, Netherlands and
Norway that during the period 1990-2008 experienced both decreasing preference for order
in nation and increasing trust. These countries in the last two decades were characterized
by an increasing perception of the need to reform, and the success of the welfare and work-
fare reforms inspired to flexicurity principles (Algan and Cahuc [2]). Finally DisTrust and
OrderNation have been relatively stable in Switzerland over the sample period.
Finally, it is important to notice that ETCR is strongly correlated, at the 1% significance
level with our proxies for regulator’s preferences DisTrust and OrderNation. This correla-
tion is explained by Aghion et al. [1], and Djankov et al. [14]: high-trusting and ‘order-free’
nations tend to prefer very few controls on opening a business, whereas low-trusting and se-
cured countries, present higher preferences for regulations and tend to impose heavy barriers
to entry.16
4.4 Results
Table 1 reports estimates for the commodity tax response function in (23). OLS estimates
in column [1] indicate a negative impact of CTAX TP on CTAX, significant at the 5% level
and a significant negative impact of ETCR on CTAX TP . The former result is counterin-
tuitive as it suggests that commodity taxes are strategic substitutes under the destination
principle. However, as explained before, these OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent
due to endogeneity. More specifically, spatial error dependance is a concern for CTAX TP
as spatially correlated unobserved factors may exist that may provide a false evidence of
strategic interaction in commodity taxation (Brueckner [7]).
In columns [2] and [3] we deal with these problems and perform two stage least squares
(2SLS) and Hansen’s Generalized Method of Moment (GMM), using OrderNation, DisTrust
(in five year lag), VAT TP and EUVAT93 TP as instruments for ETCR and CTAX.17 The
that seemed to fail to reflect the mood of the electorate. The rising trust in the 2000s seems to reflect the
success of the referendum to change the electoral system to mixed proportional representation, which led to
an effective change in political representation in the country.
15It is generally acknowledged that the ‘shock’ that triggered the resurgence of distrust in these countries
during the 90s has been the fall of the communist regime in Russia and East European countries. Fur-
thermore, the fall of communism and the war in ex-Yugoslavia did produce a fealing of fear against rise of
immigration. These have been often perceived as ‘dangerous’ to national communities and led to the election
of governments supported by extreme right and nationalist parties (see European Commission [8]).
16Aghion et al. [1] notice that the relationship goes both directions, i.e. distrust and social disorder create
regulation, which in turn, feeds further distrust and social disorder.
17Since there are l = 4 instruments for k = 2 endogenous regressors, the equation is overidentified. In
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tests confirm that instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, they explain a
relevant portion of their variance in the first stage regression and they provide valid exclusion
restrictions in the second stage.18 The Pagan-Hall and Wooldridge tests reject at the 1% level
the null hypotheses of homoskedasticity and absence of serial correlation in the idiosyncratic
errors. Consequently, we compute Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC)
standard errors in columns [2] and [3]. Finally, the RESET test confirms that there are no
problems of omitted variables or misspecified functional form. Compared to OLS estimates,
the negative significant coefficient of CTAX TP turns to a (positive) non-significant one.
This indicates that, once we correct for endogeneity, strategic interactions in commodity
taxation are not significantly different from zero. Up to our knowledge, this is the first
paper that shows the absence of commodity tax interactions under the destination principle.
As mentioned earlier, this result stems from the construction of the tax indicator, which
includes only goods subject to sales and consumption taxes, and the choice of the weighting
matrix that minimizes cross-border shopping.
The effects of regulation is also important to notice. The negative coefficient of ETCR in
2SLS and GMM estimates becomes bigger in size and significant at the 1% level suggesting
that a one point increase in ETCR produces about a 0.5 percentage points decrease in the
effective tax rate CTAX. Finally, the positive significant coefficient of VAT indicates that
the adoption of a value-added based system of commodity taxation entails an increase of
the effective tax rate up to 0.8 percentage points while the negative significant coefficient
of EUVAT93 suggests that the EU VAT reform reduces the average effective consumption
tax rate by 0.5 percentage points. The former finding is consistent with the view that the
this case 2SLS and GMM yield different results. In fact, 2SLS collapses the information contained in the
l instruments to derive only k moment conditions. The GMM estimator solves a different optimazation
problem, by deriving l moment conditions and using them to derive the optimal weighting matrix. As a
result, the GMM estimator is more efficient than the 2SLS estimator. However, the highest efficiency of
GMM comes at a price in terms of estimates’ precision in the presence of small sample size. For this reason
it is useful to report both estimates, to have an overview of results that keeps into account the possible
bias arising under each estimator. Note finally that 2SLS and GMM assign all instruments to all first stage
regressions, leaving each instrument free to ‘bind’ in the relative first-stage equation. In the sensitivity
analysis we assign each instrument directly to the ‘a priori’ relevant endogenous regressor (i.e. VATTP
and EUVAT93TP to CTAXTP and OrderNation, DisTrust to ETCR), by estimating the entire system of
equations by three stages-least-squares (3SLS).
18The low Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics seems to suggest instruments are weak. However this is
driven by the fact that we take five lags of OrderNation and DisTrust. Five years lags minimize endogeneity
issues, but also impose a cost in terms of instruments’ explanatory power in the first stage. Overall, we
decide to keep this specification for two reasons. First, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic rejects at the
1% level the null hypothesis that the system is underidentified in the first stage; second the Anderson-Rubin
statistic, which is robust to the presence of weak instruments, confirms that endogenous regressors are jointly
significant in the second stage.
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switch from a sales-based to a value added based system of commodity taxation increases
tax collection, and therefore the effective tax rate. The latter suggests that the 1993 reform
reduced VAT efficiency in the EU e.g. favouring tax avoidance practices (see OECD [26] for
a review).
Table 2 reports the estimates of the regulation policy responses (24). In column [1] we
present OLS estimates, which assume that ETCRTP is exogenous. However, as explained
above, there are sound theoretical reasons to think that ETCRTP is endogenous. Thus, in
columns [2] and [3] we also perform 2SLS and GMM, using five years lags of OrderNationTP ,
and DisTrustTP as instruments for ETCRTP . Econometric tests confirm that instruments
are strongly correlated with the endogenous regressors, explain a large share of their variance
in the first stage and provide valid exclusion restrictions in the second stage, thus allowing
a robust inference. As in the previous case, the Pagan-Hall and Wooldridge tests reject at
the 1% level the null hypotheses of homoskedasticity and absence of serial correlation in the
idiosyncratic errors. Consequently, in columns [2] and [3] we report HAC standard errors.
Also in this case the RESET test confirms that we do not have problems of omitted variables
or misspecified functional form. The coefficients in Table 2 indicate that regulation policies
are strategic complements: a one point increase of ETCRTP entails a rise of about 0.5 points
in ETCR. The coefficient of DisTrust takes the expected (positive) sign. It indicates that
a 10 percentage points increase in the share of people who demands more regulation in the
country (either to enhance security or enjoy more rents) produces a 0.3 points increase in
ETCR.
It is important to clarify the economic magnitude of the forces just described because
the ETCR measure of product market regulation is a synthetic index whose measurement
is not straightforward. We interpret our results referring to a more intuitive measure of
product market regulation, i.e., the number of days that are necessary to start up a new
business (StartUp). This is one of the measures proposed by Djankov et al. [14], used by
the recent literature on determinants and economic impacts of product market regulation
(e.g. Aghion et al. [1]). Over the period 2003-2008, for which both indicators are available,
the standard deviations of ETCR and StartUp are respectively equal to 0.56 (over a scale
of 0 to 6) and 20 (days) while the two indicators are strongly correlated. Thus, the number
of days corresponding to the standard deviation of ETCR over the period 1990-2008 (i.e.,
1.49) can be approximated by 1.49 ∗ 20/0.56 ≈ 53 (days).19 This is about one third of the
19The correlation coefficient between the two indicators is 0.49, significant at the 1% level. It should be
noted however that the two measures are not fully comparable. In fact the time-to-startup indicator refers
to the whole economy while the ETCR indicator refers only to seven non-manufacturing industries. For
this reason, it could be argued that the ‘ETCR-based’ standard deviation of 53 (days) underpredicts the
true variability of product market regulation over the sample. In the next section, we analyze this issue
more in detail when checking the robustness of our results against the use of the time-to-start up measure
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reduction in time to start up achieved in the EU during the nineties. Taken at their face
values, 2SLS estimates suggest that a deregulation wave that reduces the time to start-up
by 53 days raises the effective commodity tax rate by (−0.53 ∗ −1.49) = 0.79 percentage
points (compare Table 1, column [2]). They also suggest that a country will cut its time to
start-up by 53 ∗ 0.48/1.49 ≈ 17 days in response to a deregulation wave in trade partner
countries that cut their time to start-up a firm by 53 days (compare Table 2, column [2]).20
To summarize, in this section, we have provided empirical evidence of absence of strate-
gic interaction in commodity taxation, negative impact of regulation on taxes, and finally
presence in strategic complementarity of regulation policies. The first result contrasts with
previous studies that documented strategic complementarity of taxes in origin-based regimes
(Devereux et al. [12] and Lockwood and Migali [24]). The second result provides indirect
evidence that demand for public goods is more sensitive to income than that for private
goods. The third result suggests a weak love for variety, which is consistent with empirical
results by Hummels and Klenow [21] and Ardelean [4].
5 Sensitivity analysis
5.1 Simultaneous equations models
Our 2SLS and GMM estimates reported in Tables 1 and 2 are methods of limited information
that may deliver asymptotically inefficient estimates. In fact, they neglect that the choice of
the tax levels can be correlated with the regulation choice. Moreover, they assume symmetric
foreign counterparts of response functions (23) and (24), but neglect to estimate them.
We check the robustness of our results to the adoption of full-information methods and
estimate a system of four simultaneous equations that allows us to deal with these limitations.
In particular, our model suggests that domestic and foreign regulation preferences only affect
domestic and foreign levels of regulation, respectively. Furthermore, the occurrence of a
commodity tax reform in each country shall only affect local commodity tax rates. Thus,
we assign OrderNation, DisTrust to the ETCR equation (by symmetry, OrderNationTP and
DisTrustTP to the ETCRTP equation) and EUVAT93 and VAT to the CTAX equation (by
symmetry, EUVAT93TP , VATTP to the CTAXTP equation).
In Table 3 we report two sets of estimates. In column [1], we report seemingly unrelated
regressions (SUR), which assume exogeneity of all regressors. In column [2], we report three
stages least squares (3SLS) estimates that use the specified set of instruments to address
of regulation.
20For these back-of-the-envelope calculations we prefer using 2SLS as they tend to be more precise than
GMM estimates with a small sample.
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regressors’ endogeneity. Under the assumption that these models are correctly specified,
SUR and 3SLS estimates are asymptotically more efficient than OLS and 2SLS/GMM.21
For expositional simplicity we only report coefficients for the domestic specifications, as
these are directly comparable with previous estimates. 3SLS estimates confirm the absence
of any form of commodity tax competition once we deal with endogeneity issues. They also
point to a broadly similar impact of domestic regulation on domestic taxation as the one
predicted by 2SLS/GMM estimates, respectively. Finally they also confirm that regulation
policies are strategic complements. Moreover, SUR and 3SLS estimates increase the eco-
nomic significance of EUVAT93, OrderNation, and Distrust. The estimates for CTAXTP
and ETCRTP (not reported, but available to the authors upon request) are very similar to
those reported in Table 3 for sign and significance, while coefficients are significantly smaller.
This probably reflects the fact that each country is small relative to the sum of its trade
partners.
5.2 Alternative measure of regulation: time to start up
The ETCR measure of product market regulation presents the disadvantages of being a
synthetic index whose interpretation is not immediate and whose measurement is restricted
to a subset of industrial sectors (see Conway and Nicoletti [11] for details about measurement
issues related to ETCR). Thus, we check the robustness of our results using the measure of
product market regulation proposed by Djankov et al. [14], i.e., the number of days which
are necessary to start up a new businness (StartUp).
Table 4 reports the estimates for the tax policy response (panel a) and the regulation
policy response (panel b). Caution is needed when looking at these estimates mostly due
to the short time spell (T = 7), which makes StartUp much less suitable than ETCR to
panel data analysis. The short period has several implications: (i) it does not allow us to
exploit the relevant time variation in product market regulation due to the reforms that took
place during the nineties; (ii) it renders trivial the addition of time fixed effects and reduces
the asymptotical properties of the fixed effect estimator for T −→ ∞; (iii) it reduces the
correlation of the instruments with the endogenous regressor as it allows us to exploit only
the time variation of social preferences between the periods 2000/04 and 2005/08; (iv) it
does not allow to identify strategic interactions in commodity taxation as the instruments
VATTP and EUVAT93TP do not exhibit enough time variation during 2002-2008.22
21The main pitfall of simultaneous equations models is that there is no meaningful way to check that
the system of equations is correctly specified, thus the choice of the appropriate model is only based on
theoretical considerations. In the case of 3SLS, the choice of an inappropriate model may result in lack of
consistency of the estimator (see Wooldridge [35] for details).
22The Doing Businness data include country level observations for the period 2003-2008 and has been
constructed using the exact methodology proposed by Djankov et al. [14]. We exploit this characteristic and
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Econometric tests confirm the validity of the set of instruments based on social prefer-
ences for regulation. The estimates broadly confirm the negative impact of product market
regulation on the level of consumption taxes and the strategic complementarity of regulation
policy. It naturally comes to compare these numbers to those obtained when using ETCR as
a measure of regulation. Estimates in Table 4 suggest that a 53 days reduction of domestic
time-to-start up increases the domestic effective tax rate on consumption by (0.03∗53) = 1.5
percentage points and induces trade partners to reduce their time-to-start up by 74 days, on
average. These numbers are bigger than those predicted using the ETCR measure. While
this may suggest that ETCR, being computed only on seven sectors, tend to underpredict
the true economic effects of product market regulation, caution is needed since estimates in
Table 4 are asymptotically biased for T −→∞.
5.3 Alternative weighting schemes and specifications
So far we have weighted foreign countries’ commodity taxes and regulation policies using the
import shares predicted by contiguity in culture, legal origins and geographical location. As
we explained earlier, this choice allows us to isolate the destination principle and minimize
cross-border shopping effects. In Table 5, we carry out a sensitivity analysis against the
use of alternative weighting schemes. First we consider that some of the factors that we
use to predict a country’s import may be more important than others in determining coun-
tries’ strategic interaction in fiscal and regulation policies. Thus in column [1] we consider
weights based only on a country’s trading partners sharing the same culture (as measured by
language, religion and historical relationships), while in column [2] we adopt weights based
on a country’s trading partner sharing the same legal origins.23 In column [3] we consider
neighborhood weights, which are typically used in empirical research focusing cross-border
shopping effects (Devereux et al. [12] and Lockwood and Migali [24]). This allows us to
check the sensitivity of our results to the tax principle. In fact, if the sign and significance
of our coefficients do not change with neighborhood weights, that would indicate that our
results might be simply generated by some omitted variables bias that is independent on
the tax principle adopted. Finally, in column [4] we also check our results against the use
of ‘placebo’ weights, which are randomly chosen disregarding any economic consideration.
If we find that sign and significance of our coefficients remain constant even when using
placebo weights, that might indicate some correlation generated by omitted variables bias,
which would cast further doubts on the economic interpretation of our findings.
use the 1998 value as a basis to extrapolate the country-level values of StartUp for the 2002, thus extending
the time series dimension of the panel.
23Cultural weights are constructed considering an exogenous score equal to 1 for each of the cultural
controls in the initial gravity equation (see Appendix for details). The legal weight simply considers as trade
partners countries that share the same legal origin and the same border, respectively.
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The comparison of the estimates in column [1] with the 2SLS/GMM estimates in Tables
1 and 2 shows that cultural closeness does not explain a relevant portion of the correlation
between social preferences and regulation. In fact cultural weights considerably reduce the
power of instruments in the regulation policy reaction function, resulting in a likely problem
of underidentification (panel b). As a result of the weak correlation between social preferences
and regulation, the performance of instruments is even poorer in the tax reaction function
(panel a). Overall, sign and significance of coefficients do not change. The estimates in
column [2] instead suggest that the common legal origins are important determinants of
the correlation between social preferences and regulation, as shown by the higher values
of weak and underidentification test statistic in panels a and b. Also in this case, the
size and significance of the coefficients remain roughly stable. Interestingly, when we opt
for neighborhood weights in column [3], the evidence of competition in regulation policy
disappears, while some evidence of commodity tax competition appears. This is consistent
with the view that neighborhood weights put more emphasis on cross-border shopping effects
because of the existence of origin-based consumers’ transactions and confirms that results
reported in Tables 1 and 2 are specific to the destination principle. In column [4], we finally
report estimates when we use weights based on the ‘nonsense’ procedure by Case et al.
[10], which assigns ωij > 0 if the name of country j comes after country i in the alphabet.
Evidence in column [4] indicates that the use of placebo weights cancels any evidence of
competition in regulation policy in panel b while induces a negative significant coefficient
if CTAXTP in panel a, which suggest a bias similar to the one arising in OLS estimates
(compare Table 1, column [1]).
Finally, in Table 6, we perform a number of robustness checks against alternative spec-
ifications. First, we run our model without controls, i.e., just with the country and time
fixed effects. This allows us to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated relative to
the number of available observations. The sharp increase of the Hansen J-statistics in panel
a in column [1] suggests the omission of controls introduces some omitted variable bias in
the estimates of the commodity tax policy. In contrast, the omission of controls does not
introduce any bias in the estimates of the regulation policy. The more significant coefficient
of OrderNation and Wald F-statistics indicate that the instruments have a higher explana-
tory power in the first stage regressions of the regulation policy if we do not include the set
of controls.
We also investigate whether our results are driven by unobserved country specific shocks
in an open economy. We replace the country fixed effects with country specific time trends
in column [2]; we add controls for the output gap and the real exchange rate in column
[3]; we add a control for trade openness in column [4]. The estimated coefficients and
econometric tests do not significantly differ from our previous estimates. This confirms
that unobserved heterogeneity associated with asymmetric shocks is not a concern in our
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estimates. Among the cyclical controls (not reported) the output gap displays a negative
weakly significant impact on regulation policy. This suggests that, on average, economic
expansions (as measured by a rise of the actual output over its expected level) are associated
with a lower regulation. The coefficient of the trade-to-GDP ratio (not reported) displays a
weak positive impact on CTAX. This suggests that a country’s propensity to import is also
associated with a higher ability to tax consumption.
We check whether our results are driven by unobserved country specific differences in
individuals’ civicness and ‘tax morale’. In fact, it is generally argued that trust is an impor-
tant determinant of tax morale (e.g. Tekeli [29]). If this was the case, previous estimates
would simply reflect the fact that low unobserved levels of tax morale induce low effective
tax rates on consumption and a high degree of regulation. In Table 6, column [4] we add
among the set of controls a measure of social tax morale drawn from the WVS and EVS (see
appendix for details). Tax morale indeed displays a significant negative impact on CTAX
and a significant positive impact on ETCR (coefficient are not reported); still our results do
not significantly differ from those reported in Tables 1 and 2.
It can be argued that equation (23) is misspecified as (i) it relies on the hypothesis
that foreign and domestic regulation policies have a symmetric impact on consumption
taxes (i.e., it assumes that ETCR=ETCRTP ) and (ii) allows for the presence of commodity
tax competition even though there are not clear theoretical reasons for tax competition
under the destination principle. in Table 6, column [6], in panel a we deal with these
objections by keeping domestic regulation distinct from foreign regulation and neglecting
foreign commodity taxation. Results show a positive (still not significant) coefficient of
ETCRTP and a bigger negative coefficient of ETCR. This evidence may suggest a weak
positive spillover effect of foreign regulation on domestic consumption. If neglected, this may
underestimate the actual impact of domestic regulation on local commodity taxes. Finally,
in column [7] we perform the estimates over the four periods average. Point estimates and
econometric tests confirm that our results hold in a medium run perspective despite of the
very small number of observations in the sample.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we study competition in product market regulation and commodity tax rates
between two trading partner countries using a general equilibrium setup where destination-
based consumption taxes finance public good provision and regulation influences the number
of firms in the economy. The model generates three theoretical predictions. First, commod-
ity tax rates are strategic, independent instruments. This is in line with the literature on
commodity tax competition under the destination principle. Second, regulation polices are
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strategic complements as long as consumers do not over value product variety. Third, reg-
ulation has a negative impact on commodity tax rates if demand for public goods is more
sensitive to income than demand for private goods. In the empirical part of the paper, we
specified an empirical model to estimate the direction of the forces described by the theory
using data on OECD countries. We found evidence to support the absence of strategic tax
interaction, the presence of strategic complementarity in regulation policies, and a negative
impact of regulation on commodity taxes. More specifically, taken at face value, our esti-
mates suggest that a domestic deregulation process that reduces the time to firm start-up
by 53 days leads to a rise in the effective commodity tax rate of 0.79 percentage points and
triggers a deregulation process of about 17 start-up days in trade partner countries. Overall,
these magnitudes are non-negligible considering that, on average, EU countries in the 1990s
reduced time to start up by about 160 days.
Finally, our results shed light on the relationship between the various policies of trading
partner countries. First, (de)regulation policies change significantly the magnitude of tax
revenues collected through consumption taxes. This is particularly important as over the
early 1990s commodity taxation has became an very important instrument of public finance,
particularly in the EU. Our research suggests that deregulation of commodity markets leads
to an increase in commodity tax revenues. Put differently, if the aim of the government is
to increase tax revenues from consumption, this will be difficult to achieve if government
increases entry regulations on commodity markets. Our findings suggest also that the reg-
ulation policies of neighboring countries have externalities on other countries, namely they
lead to tax revenue shortages due to their effect on domestic regulation and ultimately on
domestic commodity tax rates.
To our knowledge, this contribution is the first theoretical study and empirical verification
of international interactions between regulators and their effects on commodity taxes. This
paper sets the stage for further research. For instance, it would be interesting to disentangle
the possible objectives of regulators in terms of product safety, product quality, bureaucracy
and corruption. This should be done theoretically and empirically.
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Figure 1: Average effective tax rate on consumption (CTAX) and barriers to
firms’ entry (ETCR).
Notes: Differences between country averages over the periods 2004/08 and 1990/94.
Authors’ calculation on OECD data.
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Figure 2: Domestic and foreign barriers to firms’ entry (ETCR).
Notes: Differences between country averages over the periods 2005/08 and 1990/93.
Authors’ calculation on OECD data.
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Figure 3: Preferences for order in nation (OrderNation) and distrust other people
(DisTrust).
Notes: Differences between country averages over the periods 2004/08 and 1990/94.
Authors’ calculation on EVS/WVS data.
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Table 1: Commodity tax response
[1] OLS [2] 2SLS [3] GMM
CTAXTP –0.84** 0.72 0.73
(0.33) (1.19) (1.18)
ETCR –0.14** –0.53*** –0.52***
(0.06) (0.20) (0.20)
VAT 0.78*** 0.73*** 0.74***
(0.20) (0.26) (0.26)
EUVAT93 –0.28 –0.38* –0.39*
(0.18) (0.22) (0.21)
R sq. 0.99 0.98 0.98
N 389 389 389
Shea Partial R2 CTAXTP - 0.07 0.07
ETCR - 0.11 0.11
K-P rk Wald F-stat - 1.725 1.725
K-P rk LM-stat (p-value) - 17.89 (0.00) 17.89 (0.00)
Hansen J-stat (p-value) - 0.154 (0.93) 0.154 (0.93)
A-R Wald test (p-value) - 13.38 (0.01) 13.38 (0.01)
Notes: ETCR is lagged by two years. ETCR and CTAXTP are instrumented
by OrderNation and DisTrust in five years lags, VATTP and EUVAT93TP , in
columns [2] and [3]. All specifications include one year lagged total population,
per capita GDP, government consumption expenditure, real interest rate on gov-
ernment bonds. Specifications also include dummies for rightwing government,
country belonging to the EU and the EMU plus country and time fixed effects.
We report robust standard errors in parentheses in column [1] and Heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses in columns
[2] and [3]. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%.
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Table 2: Regulation response
[1] OLS [2] 2SLS [3] GMM
ETCRTP 0.55*** 0.48*** 0.46***
(0.12) (0.18) (0.16)
OrderNation 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
DisTrust 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R sq. 0.93 0.93 0.93
N 399 399 399
Partial Rsq - 0.52 0.52
K-P rk Wald F-stat - 52.99 52.99
K-P rk LM-stat (p-value) - 36.29 (0.00) 36.29 (0.00)
Hansen J-stat (p-value) - 0.090 (0.76) 0.090 (0.76)
A-R Wald test (p-value) - 7.334 (0.02) 7.334 (0.02)
Notes: ETCRTP is instrumented by five years lag of OrderNationTP
and DisTrustTP in columns [2] and [3]. All specifications include
one year lagged total population and per capita GDP. Specifications
also include dummies for rightwing government, country belonging
to the EU and the EMU plus country and time fixed effects. Robust
standard errors in parentheses in column [1]. Heteroskedasticity and
Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors in parentheses in
columns [2] and [3]. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5%
∗ ∗ ∗: 1%.
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Table 3: Alternative estimators: simultaneous equations models
[1] SUR [2] 3SLS
CTAX ETCR CTAX ETCR
CTAXTP –0.96*** 0.48
(0.26) (0.40)
ETCR –0.22*** –0.37***
(0.06) (0.11)
EUVAT93 –0.37** –0.42**
(0.17) (0.17)
VAT 1.02*** 1.05***
(0.16) (0.16)
ETCRTP 0.85*** 0.86***
(0.13) (0.14)
OrderNation 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
DisTrust 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.00)
R sq. 0.99 0.93 0.98 0.93
N 370 370 370 370
Notes: SUR and 3SLS estimates of a four equations’ sys-
tem with four endogenous variables (CTAX, CTAXTP , ETCR,
ETCRTP ). CTAX is instrumented by EUVAT93 and VAT,
while ETCR is instrumented by OrderNation and DisTrust
in column [2]. Only results for domestic specifications are
reported while foreign specifications are perfectly symmetric.
Each (domestic and foreign) equation also includes the usual
set of controls as in Tables 1 and 2. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5%
∗ ∗ ∗: 1%.
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Table 4: Alternative measure of regulation: number of days to set up a business
[1] OLS [2] 2SLS [3] GMM
Panel a: regulation and tax policy (CTAX)
StartUp –0.00 –0.03** –0.03**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
R sq. 0.99 0.99 0.99
N 146 146 146
Partial Rsq - 0.14 0.14
K-P rk Wald F-stat - 4.256 4.256
K-P rk LM-stat (p-value) - 8.962 (0.01) 8.962 (0.01)
Hansen J-stat (p-value) - 1.452 (0.23) 1.452 (0.23)
A-R Wald test (p-value) - 22.59 (0.00) 22.59 (0.00)
Panel b: regulation competition (StartUp)
StartUpTP 1.17*** 1.46*** 1.32***
(0.30) (0.38) (0.36)
R sq. 0.79 0.79 0.79
N 146 146 146
Partial Rsq - 0.54 0.54
K-P rk Wald F-stat - 56.48 56.48
K-P rk LM-stat (p-value) - 29.99 (0.00) 29.99 (0.00)
Hansen J-stat (p-value) - 1.201 (0.27) 1.201 (0.27)
A-R Wald test (p-value) - 15.06 (0.00) 15.06 (0.00)
Notes: Controls in panel a include POP, GDPxc, Right, Rexch, CG
and Irate. Controls in panel b include POP, GDPxc, Right, Rexch,
five years lags of OrderNation and DisTrust. All specifications also
include country fixed effects. In panel a, columns [2] and [3] StartUp
is instrumented by five years lags of OrderNation and DisTrust. In
panel b, columns [2] and [3] StartUpTP is instrumented by five years
lags of OrderNationTP and DisTrustTP . Robust standard errors in
parentheses in column [1]. Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation
Consistent (HAC) standard errors in parentheses in columns [2] and
[3]. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%.
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Table 5: Alternative weighting schemes
[1] cultural [2] legal [3] neighborhood [4] placebo
weights weights weights weights
Panel a: regulation and tax policy (CTAX)
ETCR –0.72*** –0.63** –0.23 –0.62***
(0.23) (0.25) (0.20) (0.22)
CTAXTP 0.52 –0.00 0.73** –0.40**
(0.46) (0.39) (0.31) (0.18)
R sq. 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
N 389 389 389 389
K-P rk Wald F-stat 2.303 4.056 2.388 6.206
K-P rk LM-stat (p-value) 6.737 (0.08) 13.28 (0.00) 14.89 (0.00) 19.21 (0.00)
Hansen J-stat (p-value) 2.886 (0.28) 0.32 (0.85) 2.336 (0.31) 0.79 (0.45)
Panel b: regulation competition (ETCR)
ETCRTP 0.88*** 0.37** 0.08 –0.13
(0.33) (0.14) (0.23) (0.21)
R sq. 0.88 0.93 0.93 0.93
N 399 399 399 399
K-P rk Wald F-stat 3.574 42.25 12.34 17.18
K-P rk LM-stat (p-value) 6.962 (0.03) 35.86 (0.00) 18.36 (0.00) 12.39 (0.00)
Hansen J-stat (p-value) 1.244 (0.26) 0.013 (0.91) 1.251 (0.26) 0.025 (0.97)
Notes: GMM estimates with HAC standard errors in parentheses. All specifications in
panel a,b include the same set of controls as in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Significance
levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%.
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Appendix A Data
ETCR: we restrict our attention on the ‘low level’ ETCR indicator which measures the
barriers to entry of new firms in seven non-manufacturing industries: electricity, gas, air
passenger transport, rail transport, road freight, and postal services. In the energy sector
indicators for entry regulation focus on terms and conditions for third party access (TPA)
and the extent of choice of supplier for consumers. Entry regulation in rail transport services
distinguishes i) free entry (with access fees to the rail network infrastructure), ii) franchising
to several firms and iii) franchising to a single firm. Entry regulation in passenger air
transport services covers, on the domestic side, the liberalization of internal routes and,
on the international side, the participation in an agreement liberalizing access to routes
within a region. Entry regulation in road freight looks at more subtle ways in which entry
can be thwarted in this eminently competitive sector: through a restrictive or discretional
licensing system and through the intervention of incumbents in decisions concerning entry or
price setting. In the communication sector, indicators for entry regulation are based on legal
limitations on the number of competitors allowed in each of the post and telecommunications
markets covered by the analysis (see Conway and Nicoletti [11] for further details).
CTAX: We followed the methodology by Carey and Rabesona [9] which computes the
marginal effective tax rates relating the tax revenues to the relative tax base. We thus apply
the following formula
CTAX =
T5110
(CP + CG− CGW ) ∗ 100 (A-1)
where:
T5110 : general taxes on good and services (includes VAT, sales taxes and other taxes
on goods and services; OECD Revenue Statistics).
CP : Private final consumption expenditure (OECD National Accounts).
CG : Government final consumption expenditure (OECD National Accounts).
CGW : Government final wage consumption expenditure (OECD National Accounts).
Notice that (A-1) is different from the definition provided by Carey and Rabesona [9] in
that it excludes those revenues which are most likely to reflect the application of the origin
principle to consumers’ transactions (i.e., excise taxes, profits of fiscal monopolies, custom
and import duties and taxes on specific services). These tax items are nevertheless included
in the denominator as they also provide the tax base to conventional VA/sales taxation.
OrderNation, DisTrust: OrderNation is constructed as the percentage of respondents
which gives answer 1 (i.e., ‘maintaining order in nation’) to questions E003 in WVS1-5, V201
in EVS4, V190 in EVS3, Q532A in EVS2, V460 in EVS1. DisTrust is constructed as the
percentage of respondents which gives answer 2 (i.e., ‘Can’t be too careful’) to questions
A165 in WVS1-5, V62 in EVS4, V66 in EVS3, Q241 in EVS2, V208 in EVS1. We assigned
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country observations for the available years to five periods, each period broadly corresponding
to the intended coverage of a EVS/WVS wave. Alternative measures of DisTrust are the
percentage of respondents which gives answer 4 (i.e., ‘none at all’) to questions E069 8 in
WVS1-5, V212 in EVS4, V207 in EVS3, q553i in EVS2, v546 in EVS1 (how much confidence
in civil service) and the percentage of respondents which gives answer 4 (i.e., ‘none at all’) to
questions E069 13 in WVS1-5, v219 in EVS4, 027 in EVS3, q554K in EVS2, v547 in EVS1
(how much confidence in major companies). The period is as follows:
1980-89 : coverage by EVS1/WVS1 but for CHE, CZR and SLK covered by EVS2.
Surveys carried in 1981 for AUS, BEL, DEU, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, IRE, JPN,
NLD; 1982 for CAN, HUN, NOR, KOR, NOR, SWE, USA; 1984 for ICE and 1989 for CHE,
CZR, POL, SLK.24
1990-94 : coverage by EVS2/WVS2. Surveys carried in 1990 for AUT, BEL, CAN, DEU,
DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, ICE, ITA, JPN, KOR, NLD, NOR, POL, PRT, SWE, USA;
1991 for CZR, SLK, HUN. Notice that we have two observations for ESP (1990 and 1990)
corresponding to both WVS2 and EVS2 being carried that year.
1995-99 : coverage by EVS3/WVS3. Surveys carried in 1995 for AUS, ESP, JPN, USA;
1996 for CHE, FIN, KOR, NOR, SWE; 1997 for DEU and POL; 1998 for CZR, GBR, HUN,
BEL, GBR, NZL, SLK; 1999 for AUT, BEL, CZR, DEU, DNK, ESP, FRA, GBR, GRC,
HUN, ICE, IRE, ITA, NLD, POL, PRT, SWE, USA. Notice that we have two observations
for ESP (1995 and 1999), DEU (1997 and 1999), GBR (1998, 1999), HUN (1998, 1999) and
USA (1999), corresponding to both WVS3 and EVS3 being carried in those countries.
2000-04 : coverage by WVS4 but for FIN and NZL, covered by EVS3 and WVS5, respec-
tively. This period is generally not covered by any EVS wave, thus the majority of European
countries is not surveyed. Surveys carried in 2000 for CAN, ESP, FIN, JPN; 2001 for KOR;
2004 for NZL.
2005-08 : coverage by EVS4/WVS5. Surveys carried in 2005 for AUS, FIN, ITA, JPN,
KOR, POL; 2006 for CAN, DEU, FRA, GBR, NLD, SWE, USA; 2007 for CHE, ESP; 2008
for AUS, CHE, CZR, DEU, DNK, ESP, FRA, GRC, HUN, IRE, NLD, NOR, POL, PRT,
SLK. Notice that we have two observations for AUS (2005 and 2008), CHE (2007 and 2008),
DEU (2006, 2008), ESP (2007, 2008), FRA (2006, 2008), NLD (2006, 2008), POL (2005,
2008), corresponding to both WVS5 and EVS4 being carried.
Observations were averaged out by country and period thus obtaining an unbalanced
panel of (up to) 27 countries for the covering the period 1990-2008 in five years averages.
Missing observations were obtained by linear interpolation. The initial observation covering
the period 1980-89, has not been used in the empirical analysis, but provided the basis to ob-
24Data for former Czechoslovakia actually refer to 1990 but we decided to assign them to this period as
1990 in these countries is still representative of the pre-transition (transition in former Czechoslovakia was
launched in 1991).
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tain the observation for the period 1990-94 by linear interpolation rather than extrapolation
for countries where observations were missing for this period.
VAT, EUVAT93: Dummies equal to 1 when the VAT system/VAT EU reform is intro-
duced (OECD Consumption Tax Trends, 2008).
Other variables used in the analysis
StartUp: Number of days to set up a businness (Doing Business, World Bank).
Euro: Dummy variable equal to 1 when a country accesses the European Monetary
Union.
Right : Rightwing Orientation of the Government (EXECRLC=1, World Bank’s DPI).
POP : Total population (millions of individuals, World Bank’s WDI).
GDP : Gross Domestic Product, current US dollars (World Bank’s WDI).
GDPxc: Per capita GDP: Gross Domestic Product/Total population (World Bank’s
WDI).
CGSH : Government final consumption expenditure as a share of total GDP (OECD
National Accounts).
Irate: Long-term interest rate on government’s bonds (OECD Economic Outlook).
Output gap: Percentage deviation of output from trend (OECD Economic Outlook).
Real exchange rate: Ratio of home country’s prices to a weighted average of competitor
country’s prices, relative to a base year (2000) and measured in US dollars. Therefore an
increase is an appreciation of the home country’s real exchange rate (OECD Main Economic
Indicators).
Trade to GDP ratio: Ratio of trade flows over total GDP (OECD Main Economic Indi-
cators).
Tax Morale: percentage of respondents which give score 8-10 (i.e., ‘always’) to the ques-
tion ‘do you think it is justifiable cheating on taxes’ (WVS/EVS).
Variables used for the construction of the weights
Imp: Total Imports in 1980, US dollars importer report (IMF DOTS).
contig : dummy equal to 1 if countries share a border (CEPII gravity dataset).
smctry : dummy equal to 1 if countries were are the same country (CEPII gravity dataset).
collink : dummy equal to 1 if countries have had common colonizer after 1945 or have
ever had a colonial link or are currently in a colonia relationship (CEPII gravity dataset).
comlang : dummy equal to 1 if countries share a common official language or if a language
is spoken by at least the 9% of the population in both countries. (CEPII gravity dataset).
legorig : dummy equal to 1 if countries share the same legal origin (Data on regulation
used in Botero et al. [6]).
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dist : distance between the most important cities/agglomerations (in terms of population)
of the two countries (CEPII gravity dataset).
distwces : distance between the most important cities/agglomerations (in terms of popula-
tion) of the two countries weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s population
according to the general formula by Head and Mayer [19] with sensitivity of trade flows to
bilateral distance equal to -1 (CEPII gravity dataset).
Appendix B Weights’ construction: augmented grav-
ity equation
Based on our theoretical priors, we want to weight the strategic interaction of country i
with country j based on its propensity to import from country j. A natural measure of
this propensity would be given by the share of country i’s imports from country j over
total country i’s imports. This measure however is endogenous with respect to consumption
taxation and product market regulation due to both reverse causality and omitted variables
bias.25
The first step to address endogeneity is to focus on imports in 1980 e.g. prior to the
start of our sample. In this way we rid out the possibility of direct reverse causality from
commodity taxes and product market regulation to imports. Using the past values of imports
however does not address the issue of omitted variable bias in the presence of unobserved
structural characteristics of the country which affect both regulation, taxation and imports.
The second step we perform is then to construct a weight measure based on country i’s
imports predicted by the structural characteristics of each ij couple of trade partners such as
countries’ size, distance, culture, legal origin, and historical relationship. We thus estimate
the following augmented gravity equation where imports’ flows are expressed as a function
of the specific attributes of the importer and exporter (as captured by population size and
per capita GDP) as well as time invariant ‘dyadic’ characteristics (see Head, Mayer and Ries
[20] for details):
ln(Impij) = a1ln(POPi) + a2ln(POPj) + a3ln(GDPxci) + a4ln(GDPxcj)+ (B-2)
+ a5ln(Distij) + a6contigij + a7collinkij + a8comlangij + a9legorij + ξij.
25For example reverse causality may go from consumption taxes towards imports’ shares if the level of
taxes in country i influences the decision of country j to export in country i or in some other country −i.
Along similar lines, product market regulation in country j determines the relative prices of its goods thus
influencing the decision of country i whether to import from j or from some other country −j. Omitted
variable bias may arise if unobserved structural characteristics exist of a country which affect both its over
time variation in taxation, regulation and imports.
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Results from OLS estimates are reported in Table B-1. From the estimate coefficients, we
reconstruct the predicted imports’ flows ￿Impij26 and construct from it the exogenous weight
as ωij =
dImpijP
i￿=j dImpij .
Table B-1: Gravity equation - predicted imports.
ln(POPi) 0.76***
(0.03)
ln(POPj) 0.83***
(0.03)
ln(GDPxci) 1.00***
(0.07)
ln(GDPxcj) 1.29***
(0.09)
ln(Distij) –0.65***
(0.03)
contig 0.18
(0.11)
collink 0.36*
(0.19)
comlang 0.34***
(0.11)
legor 0.37***
(0.08)
Constant –22.42***
(1.36)
R sq. 0.88
N 420
Notes: OLS estimates;
robust standard errors in
parentheses. Significance
levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ :
5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%.
26In equation (B-2) the coefficient of contig is very weakly significant at the 10% probably due to the fact
that in our sample of 21 OECD countries the variation in the geographical position is mostly captured by
the distwces variable. Nevertheless we decided to include contig in (B-2) due to the strong theoretical a
priori in favour of the importance of shared borders to imports.
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Appendix C Coefficients of the controls included in
the main set of estimates
Table C-2: Commodity tax response: controls
[1] OLS [2] 2SLS [3] GMM
EU 0.16 –0.10 –0.13
(0.29) (0.40) (0.38)
EMU –0.42*** –0.53*** –0.53***
(0.12) (0.15) (0.14)
POP –0.03*** –0.02 –0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDPxc 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.24***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
CGSH 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Irate –0.21*** –0.20*** –0.20***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Right 0.11 0.07 0.07
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
Constant 6.17** –3.54 –3.53
(2.45) (7.90) (7.78)
Notes: These are the coefficients of the control
variables in estimates reported in Table 1. Signif-
icance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗:
1%.
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Table C-3: Regulation response
[1] OLS [2] 2SLS [3] GMM
EU –0.07 –0.07 –0.08
(0.15) (0.17) (0.17)
EMU –0.54*** –0.55*** –0.55***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
GDPxc 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
POP 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Right –0.12** –0.12** –0.13**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant –1.99*** –1.73* –1.60*
(0.68) (0.96) (0.86)
Notes: These are the coefficients of the control
variables in estimates reported in Table 2. Sig-
nificance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗:
1%.
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